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Intraindustry Trade (IIT) is one of the outstanding facts 
which can be observed in trade figures of manifacture industries 
of the last twenty years in industrialized countries. IIT is 
simply the simultaneous importation and exportation of similar 
or even homogeneous goods. To be more outspoken IIT appears, 
for instance, each time Italy imports a Volkswagen Golf from 
Germany while exporting to Germany a Fiat Ritmo. This typical 
matching of exports of one industry with imports of the same 
industry, during the same accounting period,is called IIT.
The extent to which export patterns are similar to or differ 
from import patterns, i.e. the degree of IIT specialization, 
can be evaluated by resorting to an index to which we shall 
refer in section 3.
If we want to explain IIT in a suitable way we have to 
refer to other phenomena which are shown in recent trade figures 
of manufactures in western industrialised countries. These 
phenomena are called "new stylized facts of trade". They can 
be grouped in three major propositions; they are closely 
intertwined, and, last but not least, they have been an 
enormous challenge to the traditional theories of trade of 
both neoclassic and classic sources.
The first fact: a major chunk of international trade in 
value terms intervenes among industrialized countries whose 
relative factor endowments are most of the time roughly similar. 
If this is the case trade of the kind figured out by Heckscher- 
Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) theorems should be minimal or even 
absent (1). In fact, in traditional theories, what makes 
nations exchange their goods are differences of any kind in 




























































































is often scanty, other grounds of trade have to be found out.
The second fact says that much trade of manufactured 
goods among industrialised countries is intraindustrial in 
character. As specified above, countries tend to import and 
to export all manufactured goods simultaneously.
The third fact is linked to the Custom Union (CU) issue. 
According to the traditional theory of trade, the establishment 
of a CU should foster HOS specialization.
In Europe, before the establishment of the CU in certain 
countries some industries could survive just because of a 
protectionist shelter. After the establishment of the CU these 
industries should be competed down and taken over by other 
countries. Surplisingly in the years following the Treaty of 
Rome, in the EEC just the opposite happened, i.e. there 
was an increase of IIT specialization, which can be seen 
clearly from table 1 (Section 3) from 1962 to 1972.
The main object of this paper is both the analysis of IIT 
in a CU (EEC) and the differences in trade patterns as between 
members of the CU and industrial non-member countries. In 
section 2 we shall survey briefly the main determinants of IIT 
in the empirical and theoretical literature; in section 3 we 
shall briefly comment on the empirical findings on IIT presented 
in table 1 and 2; in section 4 a partial equilibrium and a 
general equilibrium analysis are presented; in section 5 a 
cross-section test on EEC data of 1979 is performed. 
Disaggregated data for 3-digit-SITC industries are left to 





























































































2. A survey of theoretical and empirical determinants of IIT
The literature on IIT has been developed following two 
distinct paths. The first one is empirical, and had its 
climax in the '60s and the '70s. The second one is theoretical 
and started in the late '70s.
In empirical studies the emphasis is put on several 
variables which are also shared by theoretical studies. Let 
us sum them up in a simple taxonomy.
1) Variables of market structure: i) monopolistic competition, 
oligopolistic competition and all kinds of imperfect 
market features which seem to lead to IIT; ii) variables 
concerning the specification of individual demand for 
differentiated goods produced by the same sector. Both 
market structure imperfections and differentiation on the 
demand side seem to have a positive influence on the level 
of IIT. These variables are usually proxied by indices
of concentration, degree of differentiation in an 
industry, advertising expenditure etc.
2) Technological variables:i.e. economies of scale, internal
to the firm-plant. The usual framework of external economies 
of traditional models is being supplemented by more realistic 
plant economies of scales, which means that cost-elasticity 
is less than 1.
3) Institutional and policy variables: the existence of CUs, 
the level and diffusion of tariffs and their substitutes 
(export subsidies, import quotas, administrative barriers 
of various kinds etc.).
4) Macroeconomic variables: similarities of relative endowments 
of factors, similarities of income per capita and/or 




























































































If we were to reconstruct a typical empirical study of IIT of 
the last ten years we would have to see a positive influence 
of economies of scale at firm level, a positive influence 
of macroeconomic variables such as similarities of consumption 
patterns and standard of living summarized by income per capita 
indices. The residual two groups of variables have an influence 
which is not unanimously determined in signs and specifications(2). 
The theoretical literature has tried to group together the most 
interesting elements of the empirical literature giving them 
room in formal models of IIT.
The theory of IIT is mainly based on the existence of 
economies of scale at the plant-firm level. Economies of scale 
are coupled to two diverse specifications of individual demand 
for differentiated goods (according to whether one uses a 
Stiglitz-Dixit (1977) model of monopolistic competition 
with economies of scale or instead a Lancaster (1980), Helpman 
(1981) model of demand for characteristics in a monopolistic 
market). In most of these models trade is no longer the 
outcome of differences in some structural variable across 
nations, but simply due to the benefit countries get from 
trade when goods are differentiated and their production can 
be concentrated in fewer, plants because of economies of scale.
This may not be the case if there are different production 
techniques of differentiated goods. As Norman-Dixit (1980) 
pointed out the result may depend on the size of plants 
existing in autarky. Goods produced with low fixed costs in 
autarky are likely substituted by products with high fixed 
costs as the market expands. Some goods will disappear and 
some new ones will be introduced. The effects of trade on 




























































































use less general models where the usual uniformity and homogeneity 
assumptions of firms and plants allow us to draw some clear 
conclusions.
Let us sum up the main thread of these models. On the 
supply side: many firms with one plant produce differentiated 
goods in monopolistically competitive markets a la Chamberlin- 
Stiglitz-Dixit. Each firm uses the same technique and there 
are economies of scale due to a fixed cost. Technological 
symmetry leads to equal costs for all firms. On the demand 
side, differentiation enters individual welfare through the 
effect of variety on utility. This is a substantial improvement 
with respect to the old specifications of individual welfare, 
which allows us to comprehend one of the main aspects of 
today's goods markets.
Equilibrium is reached because economies of scale are 
halted by the specification of individual demand. In equilibrium 
the degree of differentiation supplied by firms is coupled 
to the extent of variety consumers are willing to buy. The 
diffusion of differentiation has a cost which is measured by 
the magnitude of "idle" economies of scale. Let us see the 
question intuitively: if average cosfe decrease less than the 
price when producing a further unit of a good, (to be read on 
the demand curve faced by the firm) it will not be profitable 
to the firm to increase the quantity supplied.
If before it was breaking even, an increase of quantities 
supplied will cause losses; otherwise there would be a 
decline of profits. This means that beyond a certain point 
economies of scale are just potential; the position of that 
point is determined by two parameters: elasticity of 





























































































This result is possible since it is assumed that the 
elasticity of demand does change as the number of firms increases 
due to free entry in the market. (Dixit-Stiglitz, 1977).
If the number of goods produced is being kept constant, 
opening of trade between countries which are similar in all 
aspects has a positive effect since it reduces the level of 
"idle" economies of scale. According to the values of the 
two fundamental parameters (3) the effect of trade opening 
can be i) further exploitation of "idle" economies of scale 
keeping variety constant ii) increase in the number of 
goods supplied without further explotation of economies of 
scale iii) a mix of i) and ii) to a lesser extent.
This is the basis of trade between countries which are 
equal in all respects, as we shall see in both the partial 
equilibrium model and the general equilibrium model of 
section 4.
3. Few comments on the empirical findings
For the empirical analysis we have chosen to use the 
Grubel-Lloyd index (4) even if there are other measures of 
IIT available, as the Aquino-Grubel-Lloyd index and Glejser 
(Glejser et al. 1979) index. We have not used the former 
because based on an equilibrium condition which is not 
necessarily met, since it refers to a balanced trade.
The latter is quite useful to study trade patterns but it 
is not very far from the Grubel-Lloyd index to which we 
stick for the moment, even if for future work we shall resort 




























































































In tables 1 and 2, presented below in this section, we have 
used the Grubel-Lloyd index to evaluate IIT from the data in 
nine EEC countries. To do that we distinguished between two 
areas where trade should take place: area 1 corresponding 
to the EEC and area 2 corresponding to OECD countries which 
do not belong to the EEC (5). Data were collected only for 
macro-SITC industries 5, 6, 7, 8.
In table 1 IIT is the overall average value on area 1 and 
2. Figures show a definite increase of IIT between 1962 and 
1972 for all EEC countries and also for those countries which 
joined the EEC later. The upward trend still remains between 
1972 and 1979 except for Italy and Belgium-Luxemburg. U.K., 
Ireland, Denmark show a definite growth of IIT in the second 
period. All this accords with Balassa's (1975) remarks on the 
effects of a CU creation on the specialization patterns of 
member states. From tables 1 and 2 we can see that roughly 
half of manufacture trade in the EEC (calculated on a 
3-digit level of disaggregation) is made up of IIT (U.K. 
reaches some 85%).
In table 2 there seems to be a tendency for IIT to be 
lower in area 2 than in area 1. As already seen by Hamaguchi- 
Sazanami (1978) IIT seems to be CU biased. The only exception 
is Denmark. The disaggregated data of table 2 will be used 
in section 5 to see whether trade specialization in the EEC 
is a determinant of specialization in area 2.
From tables 1 and 2 facts 2 and 3, outlined in the 
introduction, are apparent: 1.) a great proportion of trade 
of trade between similar countries is IIT; 2.) lifting 
internal barrier in a CU is going to increase IIT instead 




























































































Disaggregated data are in appendix 1, table 3.
TABLE 1 QgE5ALL INTRAINDUSTRY TRADE IN MANUFACTURES (SITC INDUSTRIES 5.6.7.8.)



























SOURCE : my computations on OECE.OECD,EUROSTAT data,with the gentle support of the Computer Centre of I.U.E.
TABLE 2 OVERALL INTRAINDUSTRY TRADE IN MANUFACTURES (SITC INDUSTRIES 5.6.7,8.) IN AREA 1 AND 2________________________________
ITALY FRANCE GERMANY BELUX NEDERLAND U.K. DENMARK IRELAND
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 i 2
.4884 .4529
i









.5884 .5111 1.7195 .5956 .7130 .6056 .6607
i
.5831 .6550 .5988 .7311 .6480 ..4555 .6560 .2699 .5304
.556" .5304 .7746 .6249 .7450 .5846 Ol 00 cn 
>
.5838 i.6965 .5170 .8635 .6249 .5639 .6162 1.5658 .4469




























































































4. Theoretical aspects of trade between similar countries
In section 4.1 a graphical exposition of a monopolistically 
competitive market will be presented,in which variety is kept 
constant as trade is introduced. It is a partial equilibrium 
framework, from which only few insights can be drawn.
In section 4.2 a general equilibrium model based on 
Krugman (1980) is presented to see the effect of tariff 
asymmetries on the level of IIT.
4.1 A partial equilibrium view
We shall proceed by concentrating on monopolistic 
competition coupled to economies of scale at plant level, keeping 
variety constant. The graph (6) below (Figure 1) depicts the 
equilibrium of a firm in perfect monopolistic competition 
before and after the establishment of a CU. LAC is the long 
run (lr) average cost curve. DD is the true, in Chamberlin 
terminology, demand schedule, while dd is the "perceived" 
one.
In perfect monopolistic competition firms earn "temporary" 
profits in the short run (sr), yet in the lr profits will be 
competed down to zero by new entrants, as no barrier to entry 
is assumed. Product supplied x in differentiated and each 
firm-plant has the same cost function. As said in section 2, 
differentiation has no feedback on the technique adopted, 
as this is invariant with the product specification chosen 
by the firm. This restrictive assumption will be used also 





























































































(ww) This graph is a modified version of a graph appearing in 




























































































Before the CU, x is sold behind a tariff wall t.AB is 
assumed to be the tariff-inclusive world supply curve and 
equilibrium would be at B. In case of domestic production it 
could be anywhere between B and C in the sr. Yet lr equilibrium 
is at C. When sr equilibrium is at B, quantity supplied AB 
could be split between Aa (by the domestic firm) and aB (world 
supply). B would then be a lr equilibrium as well, with no 
profits. Domestic production would be accompained by imports.
If we make the assumption that sr equilibrium is at B, as 
AB are only imports, lr equilibrium will shift to C.At C 
profits are zero due to new entrants. In the lr there will be 
no trade and the number of product specifications of x will 
not change:it will be equal to the number of plants.The 
creation of a CU would augment demand for x and D'D' will 
be the relevant schedule. In the lr the domestic firm will 
be at E, although intra-union exports are protected up to 
Px(l+CET) (where CET means common external tariff):there is a cost 
reduction effect due to: 1) zero profit condition, which 
determines the number of plants and product specifications 
(as will be seen next in the general equilibrium model)
2) the deployment of economies of scale in the CU.
If partner countries imported x from the rest of the world 
(ROW) before the CU there will be trade diversion. If instead 
they produced x before the CU, trade creation will imply that 
producers in those countries will be swept away, and prices 
will be lower.
The shift from DD to D'D' has to be examined carefully.
At C there is no trade. At E trade creation is there since 
production of good x is concentrated in one country only at 




























































































countries trade creation is being accompained by an IIT effect,if 
variety is kept constant. This is what Balassa (1975) and data 
in table 1 (section 3) show (8). If variety is not kept constant 
the outcome will be less easy to predict. We shall see in the 
general equilibrium framework which are the parameters which 
determine either an increase or a decrease in variety. A 
variety reduction could appear when the CU exports to the ROW, 
if ROW has low tariffs (9). Let us see how it happens. The 
first step is a sr equilibrium: the firm attempts to 
discriminate prices, selling OH in the CU and HC to the ROW.
Free entry on the domestic market will let the firm sell OK
at price Px on the CU market and a quantity lower than before
to the ROW i.e. KL ( < HL). This will lead to a narrower choice
for the consumer, since the number of plants will have to
decrease to make room for a higher degree of exploitation
of economies of scale. The effect of all this will be a lower
level of IIT than before the introduction of exports to the
ROW. The reason can be sketched as follows. We said that
the total number of plants decreases if ROW enters the
picture (asymmetrically) that way. If industries are made up
of only two firms in monopolistic competition, one firm will
be swept away as a consequence of the CU formation, as economies
of scale become effective and give rise to trade creation
and IIT. ROW trade will make some more plants disappear: this
means that in some industries countries will experience net
trade (either net imports or net exports): Hence IIT will decline on the
aggregate even if in some industries it can stay constant.
More information might be obtained if we went through 
sr equilibria as well. Yet what could be inferred from AaBC 




























































































As seen above we introduced price discrimination in the 
sr in a monopolistically competitive market; this might not 
be considered correct. However the purpose of that was just 
to at least partially bridge the gap between the monopoly 
and the oligopoly approach (see Brander (1981)).
4.2 A general equilibrium approach
Using Krugman's model (Krugman (1980)) it is possible to 
see that under certain conditions the imposition of tariffs 
on trade is going to decrease the level of IIT. The assumptions 
of the model are quite restrictive, even though it would be 
possible to generalize the model on the basis of further 
research presented elsewhere (10).
On the demand side: there is a utility function which 
is symmetric in goods (the arguments) and equal for all 
individuals
where c^ is consumption of the ith good ;the number of goods 
actually produced in n while the number of goods which can be 
potentially produced is n and n < n
On the supply side: there is only one factor of production 
which is labour. The cost function is
0 0 < 0 < 1U = 2 c l i ( I )
1 a + 8 xl
(II)
i




























































































where 1^ is the quantity of labour needed in the production 
of
x. is the output of the firm producing good i 1 •
Apparently production in (II) displays increasing returns to 
scale sincre there is a fixed cost ( a ), decreasing average 
costs and constant marginal costs. We are still in a closed 
economy, hence we do not have leakages. Output of each firm 
must be equal to total consumption of the good produced by that 
firm (a single plant firm producing only one good which is 
firm specific, as seen in section 4.1).
x = Le i= 1........ ni i ~
Then if we assume full employment
L=E 1 = £ (a + g x )i i 1 1
(IV)
(V)
These assumptions permit us to describe the equilibrium in a 
closed economy. First we write the equilibrium price (11)
-1 9 - 1p = 9 X ( x / L) i 1 (VI)
If the number of goods is relevantly high, we can consider 
the slight change of a price by a firm as not influencing 
the marginal utility of income: i.e. the shadow price stays 
































































































The price set to maximize profits is
-1p.= 9 8 w1 (VIII)
where w is the wage rate.
The (VIII) is obtained from the usualmaxinum condition of a 
monopolistic firm, p(l-l/e)=MC.
Then we set
p = p for all i (IX)i i
owing to the symmetry across individuals and across firms 
((uniformity of cost functions, symmetry in demand, symmetry 
of reactions).
Lr equilibrium conditions imply zero profits due to free 
entry. From this condition (12) we get the level of output 






then using full employment condition,we get
L L ( 1 - 0 )
n = -------------- = ---------------------- (XI)
a + 8 x a
If we start focusing on open economies, trade will come 
out as a result of economies of scale. In particular in a world 
made up of two equal countries, with only one factor of
a 0





























































































production, trade will be a result of the way technology and 
tastes are set. Under the specification of utility and technology 
adopted, consumers will benefit from a greater variety of goods: 
there will be n + n" goods (where n" is the number of goods 
produced abroad). This a welfare gain due to trade.
Individuals will consume a fraction
n" (XII)
n + n"
of their income on foreign goods and a fraction
(XIII)
n + n"
on domestic goods. We can then determine imports and exports: 
home country imports in wage units are
L n" 
n + n"
through substitution we can get
(XIV)
L + L"
this is equal to foreign country imports; hence there will be 
a foreign trade balance, which strongly depends on the 
assumptions of equal wages and the equilibrium setting imposed.
If we assume that technological and demand symmetries 
hold, IIT can range between 0 and 1 according to the "random" 
distribution of firms and goods across industries. This is the 
case in which location theory of regional policy would not 





























































































We now take up the issue of tariffs between two countries.
We still think in terms of two countries which are similar in 
all aspects. We assume that tariffs are uniformly distributed 
across all industries, yet that there is asymmetry. This 
means that at home there are tariffs on imports, while abroad 
not. We introduce a tariff in the same way as a transport 
cost (13) is usually modeled:
p" = p" / h 0 < h < 1 (XVI)
where (XVI) defines the price of home imports, while home 
exports will be paid abroad
P = P
due to non symmetry in tariffs. We expect home consumers to buy
(P / p")1/(1-e) (XVII)
units of imported good for every unit of corresponding domestically 
produced good. If we try to write home imports and exports 
again we get
M = (n"/(n+n")) L n xj Cp/p")1^ 1 ^  (XVIII)
X = (n/(n+n")) L"n" x'^ (XIX)
where X are exports and M are imports





























































































IIT = 1 - 1 - (p/p")
i/(i-e)
(i + (p/p-) 1/(1 e) )
(XX)
Therefore IIT cannot range between 0 and 1 any longer but will 
range between 0 and a value which is less than 1. This is 
quite consistent with the results of table 2 which we have seen 
in section 3. Because of the assumptions imposed in Krugman's 
model our expectations as to what should happen in the real 
world have to be carefully tested as stated. Take the case of 
a CU. If a uniform tariff is imposed on imports from ROW we 
should expect IIT to be lower in trade figures of ROW (Area 2 
of section 3) if tariffs of imports from ROW differ from tariffs 
of ROW (14). If this is the case we should also expect IIT to 
be distributed roughly the same way within and outside the CU, 
if the degree of asymmetry of tariffs across industries is 
similar.
To sum up, theory says that countries which are similar 
in all aspects will exhibit different levels of IIT according 
to whether or not they possess a similar tariff structure.
IIT will be higher between Italy and France than between Italy 
and Finland, since Italy and France are members of the same 
CU. This implies that they Share a common external tariff 
(CET), they are part in international agreements as equal 
members (such as the Multifiber agreement, several preferential 
trade agreements, production quotas as in steel industry etc.) 
and share m a n y  non tariff barriers like those represented by 
product quality requirements, uniformity standards and so on.




























































































5. An econometric test on IIT data in two areas
If there are no tariffs and if two countries are equal 
in all respectsIIT can range between 0 and 1, while, when 
tariffs are not symmetric,IIT will be within a narrower range.
Data of table 2 (and table 3 in appendix 1) seem to 
confirm this statement . Now we want to test whether there is 
any significant casual relationship between IIT specialization 
in the EEC and in OECD (excluding EEC countries): i.e. between 
area 1 and area 2.
The hypothesis to test is linked to the previous theoretical 
section. The supposition is that IIT of EEC countries among 
themselves should be higher than IIT of EEC countries with 
OECD countries, due to asymmetry of tariffs in the two areas 
above specified. Yet IIT should have a similar distribution 
across industries in the two areas. Take for instance two 
industries: steel and furniture. If in area 1 steel exhibits 
higher levels of IIT than furniture, we would expect that in 
area 2 steel will still have higher levels of IIT than furniture. 
More precisely what we want to test is the following: 
industrial specialization (IIT 3-digit SITC indices)of manufacture 
in the EEC (area 1) determines industrial specialization of 
trade flows of EEC countries with other OECD countries (area 2).
In other words we want to see whether the distribution of IIT 
across industries is similar in area 1 and 2, provided that 
the casual link is from area 1-IIT to area 2-IIT.
What are the grounds for these two hypotheses?
First: IIT distributions within and outside the EEC should be 
similar, unless the tariff structure in such as to change the 





























































































Second: the causal direction assumed is due to the European 
structure of trade of manufactures. This structure is the 
outcome of decisions which put imports and exports in the EEC 
as determinants of imports and exports in other OECD countries.
In other words: if IIT or cross-hauling is strong in the EEC 
this feature of specialization in Europe will be transferred 
to non-EEC markets. Consider, for instance, the Italian 
automotive industry: whenever we see from figures a fair amount 
of matching of exports of Fiat's to France with imports of 
Renault's to Italy we expect to find also a similar, yet lower, 
matching of exports of Fiat' s to Sweden with imports of Volvo's 
to Italy. This happens because many European countries opened
their trade first in the EEC. Their specialization in the EEC,
or the range of differentiated products the/sell in the EEC:depends 
depends on some "peculiarities" countries have in their
consumption habits and in their culture, as Linder (15) pointed
out. These "peculiarities" found their consistency first with
other EEC countries and then became one of the most important
variables which determine their trade specialization. Incidentally
these variables should be used to "close" all models a la
Krugman to determine which country produces which goods.
To sum up: the kind of trade specialization forged in the
EEC influenced trade with other industrial non-EEC countries.
So "the international division of labour" which results from
trade figures of area 2, is a sort of "residual" determined
by the "division of labour" primarily established in the
EEC. If industrial policy in the EEC were more effective the
above statement would be even more stringent.
Whether what is said above is true, and how much it is
going to be relevant is the object of an econometric test.




























































































Grubel-Lloyd index to describe the international specialization 
should generate some caveats on the answers we would like to 
get from this test.
We estimated a structural equation on a cross-section 
of 1979 data for 8 countries (Belgium and Luxemburg are in 
Belux). The specifications used are two: 
the first one
IITi2 = 6 + C IITil + M i (XXI)
where IIT^ = H T  index in area 2 in sector i
IIT = IIT index in area 1 in sector i ll
The estimation of this equation has been performed on SITC 
indices of IIT calculated on 3-digit industries from EUROSTAT 
data (see appendix 1 where those IIT indices are shown).
The second one:
another specification has been used, as the dependent variable 
varies within an open interval which goes from 0 to 1. It is 
based on a logistic transformation of the dependent variable,
log {IIT / (1- IIT )} =  ̂ + 7  IITil + w L (XXII)
where the dependent variable is the logarithn of the odds 
that a particular specialization in area 1 will give rise to 
an analogous specialization in area 2 (16).
In table 4 we grouped all the results of estimations 
of the two different specifications. We estimated (XXII) 
and (XXI) primarily on one sample made up of four major 
industries (SITC 5,6,7,8) and then on four subsamples, one for 




























































































the stability of coefficients across industries. We then computed 
a Chow statistic (which can be found at the bottom of table 4 
for each country) in the following way
( RRSS -Z URSS ) / ( k - 1) i 1 (XXIII)
Z URSS / ( I n  - 2k - 2 ) i 1 1
where i = 1....4 number of subsamples
k = size of the entire sample
n^= size of subsamples
RRSS = restricted residual sum of squares, i.e. 
calculated on the entire sample
URSS = unrestricted residual sum of squares, i.e. 
calculated on the four subsamples (17)
The results of this test say that the stability of 
coefficients is more common than the instability (except for 
Italy and U.K.) since in most cases the critical value of the 
F statistic with 2, 142 degrees of freedom is not reached.
Table 4 needs few comments. In many cases the significance 
of coefficients is not sufficient and the non-logit specification 
often seems to perform better than the logit one (logit 
specification in table 4 is the one with the code A12 while the 
non-logit is the one with the code IIT12). The signs of 
coefficients are the opposite of what is reasonably expected
in a couple of cases only. In most of the countries and industries 
the coefficient level is very low.
All of this means that the pattern of trade in area 2 of 
EEC countries cannot be claimed to be dependent upon the 
pattern of trade in the EEC, as we expected. The issue we 
wanted to prove is not settled. In other words the patterns 
of specialization of EEC countries differ within and outside




























































































A deeper analysis of industrial data in appendix 1, or 
the use of a different measure of IIT might provide new 
evidence. The present state of this research does not permit 
us to give a different answer.
What Sazanami-Hamaguchi wrote as a comment to their tests 
on 1972 data: "The industries where levels of IIT were high 
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We have shown empirically (tables 1 and 2) that IIT is 
CU-biased: i.e. it is higher within an integrated area than 
outside. This is what can also be deducted theoretically.
Using a general equilibrium model of Krugman's type we have 
seen that,when two countries are similar in all respects, but 
display non-symmetric tariffs, the level of IIT will range 
between a range narrower than 0 and 1. The econometric test 
has tried to see whether there exists a bivariate relationships 
between IIT in area 1 and IIT in area 2,when the casual link 
is from area 1 to area 2. The answer of this test has been 
on the 'short side' of our question. In fact the relationship 
between IIT in the EEC as a determinant of IIT outside the 
EEC is either ill-specified or absent. This is just the opposite 
of Sazanami and Hamaguchi's (1978) conclusions.
There are some other conclusions which can be drawn from 
this study: some of them are more general, some are less 
general of the ones outlined above. It seems that IIT is more 
relevant in the EEC than outside even though for some European 
countries IIT seems to be less EEC oriented, as table 2 shows. 
Moreover IIT, as it has been theoretically specified, involves 
a certain degree of vagueness about which country produces 
which goods, and about the level of IIT. In fact from theoretical 
models of the kind used here we can deduce only a range of IIT 
possible values. These questions can be tackled either by 
resorting to Linder (1961) (20) or to Helpman (1981). But 
the casual nature of specialization of similar countries 
remains an important question which should be properly 
answered. A further consequence of this is that regional policy 





























































































a consequence of countries similarities. Unless one thinks 
that IIT, in areas such as the EEC, is the outcome of past, 
autarkic policies, there does not seem to be any chance of 
guessing from trade specialization any information about the 
most correct industrial policy for a country. In addition to 
that, the conclusion that IIT is not a definite feature of 
an industry,makes the above conclusion even stronger.In fact 
IIT changes its distribution across industries as we go from 
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x  -I r*» cv ĉ  cv x  c  x  , .. ................o c v r ^ ^ x x r - x t ^ c x ' - i o r x v - x r ' x~ ~ “ ~ ^ > r « 0 ' - x x x o x c x r * * c t ^  çc. ç  x
x x  x  cv ç  
r- x  x x x  
_  _  _  . . cr-i x  x  cv x  rr
r? — X C C O - ' X  — C X © X/ rr c  X c  cv X X x x c v  — — cv c r ^ r r x  
o t “' X c v r - ' X x x e ©
X CV r- rr o ©
X C ^ e r r ^ -  
o  x  x  ç  x  xx  x  © x  *
C > x x c v « - c v c v G C ^ © r r c^ c o r r x x x o c ^ x r -  r ^ r ^ .  _  _  _  .
_  . C r v' x x x r ^ c v x x © x r ^ v ' x x x r r r ^  
x © x x x x x x x x x x x x x © x x x x
x c v . r r x x x x c v x x x x c vpv a x o r* O rr X C O ’ x  iv
—  x  t" cv rr X/ x X CV X O' C O■> £fi o  x  x  cv- c  r, c v x r ^ l ^ c x x
x r v c c x c v x r ^ r r  — c x r ^ c v  —
X X X X — X X x  c  X — X — X> r- x  x  o  c  c  cv x  ĉ  x  x  — rrc  x  x  x  x  x  r' x  x  x  h- c
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We present the 3-dimensional diagram of the Grubel-Lloyd 
index as a function of imports and exports (x).
8. Appendix 2
FIGURE 2
(x)  We are grateful to Dario Sermasi who provided computer 





























































































(1) See Krugman (1981) where the volume of trade of HOS kind 
is function of the degree of diversity of relative factor 
endowments of countries engaging in trade of both IIT type 
and HOS type.
(2) See Rossini (1982, 1983).
(3) As said above these parameters are the elasticity of costs 
and the elasticity of substitution in demand. See Stiglitz- 
Dixit (1977) Krugman (1979, 1980).
(4) Grubel-Lloyd index for IIT, when measured in industry i,in 
country j, is
where X are exports and M are imports.
We present in appendix 2 a diagram in 3 dimension of 
Grubel-Lloyd index, which can be used by the reader to see 
the non-linearities of the index.
(5) The enlargement of the EEC to U.K., Denmark and Ireland 
was marked by the following stages which are of interest 
for our c.c.ta: 1972-last year before the official start
of the CU. 1973-the CU is enlarged and a transition period 
staffs with gradual lifting of trade barriers. 
lS7S-last year of transition period.
(6) See also Pelkamns (1983) chapter 8.
(7) See Dixit-Stiglitz (1977).
(8) Take the case of a CU made up of two countries A and B. 
Suppose that they are all alike. Consider an industry 
made up of two equal monopolistic firms (yet rule out 
interdependence, since n firms would be more correct).
IIT i (X ̂ j + ^ij) — £




























































































No trade is there before the CU,since equilibrium is at B 
(Fig. 1). At point E each country will have one firm for 
each industry. Trade creation and IIT will arise and 
will equal one in each industry considered.
(9) Yet lower tariffs of ROW are not a necessary condition, 
since economies of scale can counteract the effects of 
even higher tariffs in ROW.
(10) See Helpman (1981), Krugman (1981).







tt = p x  - ( a + 6 x ) w i i 1
(13) See Brander (1981)
(14) See Pelkmans (1983)
(15) See Linder (1961)
(16) See Pindyck-Rubinfeld (1976) pg. 248
(17) For this test see Maddala (1977) pg. 198. To do this test
it is assumed that (XXIII) has an F distribution, with
degrees of freedom k+1 (where k is the size of the entire
sample) and S.n. - 2k-2 where n are the sizes of the 
i i  lsubsamples.
(18) See Pelkmans (1983)
(19) See Sazanami-Hamaguchi (1978) pg. 57
= X p.l
= price of the i^ good
= shadow price or marginal utility of income
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